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AGAINST CREATIVITY 
Brian L. Frye* 
ABSTRACT: According to the Supreme Court, copyright requires 
both independent creation and creativity. The independent creation 
requirement provides that copyright cannot protect an element of a 
work of authorship that is copied from a previously existing work. 
But scholars disagree about the meaning of and justification for the 
creativity requirement. 
The creativity requirement should be abandoned because it is 
irrelevant to the scope of copyrightable subject matter and distorts 
copyright doctrine by encouraging inefficient “creativity rhetoric.” 
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The purpose of copyright is to encourage the production of 
economically valuable works of authorship, not creativity. 
INTRODUCTION 
Originality is the essence of copyright. According to the Supreme 
Court, originality requires both independent creation and some kind 
of creativity.1 However, the Court has failed to provide a coherent 
definition of or justification for either requirement. In particular, 
many scholars have struggled with the definition and propriety of 
the creativity requirement. 2  Some have tried to provide a legal 
definition of creativity; 3  others have argued that creativity is an 
ideological term, derived from the Romantic concept of authorship.4 
Some have argued that copyright may promote creativity by 
discouraging copying; 5  others argue that creativity should be 
irrelevant to copyright because it excludes factual works from 
protection.6 
The creativity requirement is indeed irrelevant, because it does 
not actually affect the scope of copyrightable subject matter, but it 
should still be explicitly abandoned because it encourages inefficient 
1 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
2 See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 830 (2010) (“But ‘creativity’ in Feist's sense gives advocates and 
courts few tools for distinguishing what is, and what is not, creative.”).
3 Russ VerSteeg, Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801, 824 (1993) (“The 
only logical approach to embracing Feist's creativity requirement is to fashion a legal 
definition for the word ‘creativity.’”).
4 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 455 (1991). 
5 Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (2015). 
6 Mark K. Temin, The Irrelevance of Creativity: Feist’s Wrong Turn and the Scope of Copy-
right Protection for Factual Works, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 263 (2006) (“The concept of cre-
ativity should be irrelevant in determining the scope of copyright protection for fac-
tual works, which is explained by the purpose of such works: the communication of 
information.”).
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“creativity rhetoric.” The purpose of copyright is to encourage the 
production of economically valuable works of authorship, not 
creativity. The creativity requirement encourages courts to overvalue 
existing works of authorship and undervalue new works of 
authorship. 
I. THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT 
Scholars have advanced many different theories of copyright,7 
but the prevailing theory of copyright is the economic theory, which 
holds that copyright is justified because it solves market failures in 
works of authorship by making them partially excludable.  
Classical economics predicts that free riding will cause market 
failures in public goods.8 In theory, government can solve market 
failures in public goods by subsidizing the production of those 
goods. Nevertheless, the Coase Theorem and public choice 
economics both predict that the resulting transaction costs will also 
cause “government failures” in public goods or market failures that 
government cannot solve because it does not know which public 
good to subsidize. Specifically, the Coase Theorem observes that 
information costs limit government’s ability to determine which 
subsidies will be efficient, 9 and public choice economics observes 
                                                          
 
 
 
7  See generally PETER S. MENELL, 2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: GENERAL THEORIES, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds. 
2000) (surveying theories of copyright). 
8 “Market failures” are inefficiencies in the market for a good; “public goods” are 
goods that are nonrival and nonexcludable; and “free riding” is the consumption of a 
good without paying the marginal cost of production. 
9 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Jeremy Kidd, Kin-
dergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141 (2014).  
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that politics limit government’s ability to provide efficient 
subsidies.10  
Works of authorship are quintessential public goods because 
they are perfectly nonrival and nonexcludable. Consumption of a 
work of authorship does not diminish the supply of the work, and in 
the absence of copyright, authors cannot limit consumption of a 
published work of authorship. Accordingly, classical economics 
predicts market failures in works of authorship caused by free riding. 
Marginal authors will not invest in the creation of works of 
authorship because they cannot recover production costs.  
Of course, government can solve some of those market failures 
by directly subsidizing the production of works of authorship, but 
direct subsidies are vulnerable to transaction costs that will still cause 
government failures. The Coase Theorem predicts that information 
costs will cause government failures because the government often 
has less information than market participants about the demand for 
works of authorship, rendering direct subsidies inefficient.11 Public 
choice economics predicts that rent-seeking will also cause 
government failures by encouraging producers to compete for 
subsidies, rather than consumer demand. 
Thus, the economic theory holds that copyright is justified 
because it solves both market failures and government failures in 
works of authorship by indirectly subsidizing their production, and 
thereby reducing the transaction costs associated with direct 
subsidies. Copyright indirectly subsidizes works of authorship by 
making them partially excludable, enabling copyright owners to 
prevent free riding. Therefore, copyright solves market failures in 
                                                          
 
 
 
10 See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 WESTERN 
ECON. J. 224 (1967); Anne Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 
AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974). 
11 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Jeremy Kidd, Kin-
dergarten Coase, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 141 (2014). 
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works of authorship by ensuring that the authors of economically 
valuable works of authorship can recover their production costs, and 
copyright solves government failures in works of authorship by 
ensuring that the economic risk associated with investing in the 
production of works of authorship is borne by authors, rather than 
the government. 
However, copyright itself may impose transaction costs if 
authors do not behave like rational economic actors. Many authors 
systematically overvalue the works of authorship they create12 and 
discount economic incentives. 13  Moreover, copyright owners may 
collectively engage in rent-seeking by requesting broader copyright 
protection and a longer copyright term. 
Notably, the economic theory of copyright is explicitly 
consequentialist, holding that copyright is justified because it 
increases net economic welfare. The copyright “quid pro quo” 
assumes that authors invest in the production of works of authorship 
in exchange for copyright protection. In other words, the economic 
theory assumes that copyright provides salient incentives for 
marginal authors to invest in the creation of works of authorship. It 
holds that copyright is justified because the economic cost of granting 
copyright protection is smaller than the economic benefit generated 
by the additional works of authorship.  
But the economic theory also implies that copyright is justified if 
and only if it increases net economic welfare. Thus, if copyright is 
justified because it increases net economic welfare, it is not justified 
when it decreases net economic welfare. Under the economic theory, 
copyright increases net economic welfare by providing salient 
incentives for marginal authors to invest in the production of works 
                                                          
 
 
 
12 See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011). 
13 See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2014). 
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of authorship. So, if and when copyright does not provide a salient 
incentive to marginal authors, it is not justified. Moreover, if and 
when the marginal cost of copyright protection exceeds the marginal 
benefit, it is also not justified. 
There are many alternative theories of copyright. Some are 
consequentialist but consider non-economic welfare. Others are 
deontological and consider the natural or expressive rights of 
authors.14 But the Supreme Court has explicitly and repeatedly held 
that the Intellectual Property Clause adopted the economic theory: 
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction 
that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is 
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents 
of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’15 
Accordingly, this Article uses the economic theory to evaluate 
the justification for the “creativity” requirement. It assumes that if 
copyright can increase net economic welfare by encouraging 
“creativity,” then copyright should require “creativity;” but if 
copyright cannot increase net economic welfare by encouraging 
“creativity,” then copyright should ignore “creativity.” 
II. THE SUBJECT MATTER OF COPYRIGHT 
Copyright only protects original works of authorship. 16 
According to the Supreme Court, “[o]riginality is a constitutional 
requirement” for copyright protection. 17  As a consequence, the 
                                                          
 
 
 
14 See generally MENELL, supra note 7. 
15 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 
(1954)).  
16 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2015). 
17 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). 
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“originality” requirement defines the subject matter of copyright. 
Oddly, however, the meaning of “originality” for copyright purposes 
is unclear. Historically, originality required only independent 
creation. Copyright could protect any work of authorship that was 
not a copy of a previously existing work of authorship. As Justice 
Holmes observed, “Others are free to copy the original. They are not 
free to copy the copy.”18 But in Feist, the Supreme Court held that 
originality requires not only independent creation, but also 
“creativity”: “Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only 
that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed 
to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some 
minimal degree of creativity.”19 Unfortunately, the Court failed to 
define “creativity” or meaningfully explain what it requires. 
III. FEIST V. RURAL 
Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. provided telephone 
service to several communities in northwest Kansas. Pursuant to 
state regulation, Rural published and distributed free of charge to its 
subscribers a telephone directory. Rural’s directory consisted of 
“white pages” and “yellow pages.” The white pages listed all of 
Rural’s subscribers in alphabetical order, along with their town of 
residence and telephone number. The yellow pages listed all of 
Rural’s commercial subscribers in alphabetical order by category, 
accompanied by paid advertisements of varying sizes. 
Feist Publications, Inc. published and distributed free of charge 
regional telephone directories that consisted of white pages and 
yellow pages. Feist typically licensed the relevant white pages 
listings from telephone service providers and competed with them 
for yellow pages advertisements. In 1978, Feist decided to publish a 
                                                          
 
 
 
18 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903). 
19 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. 
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regional telephone directory for Northwest Kansas. The region 
covered by Feist’s directory included many of Rural’s subscribers, as 
well as the subscribers of ten other telephone service providers. Feist 
offered to license the relevant white pages listings from the telephone 
service providers, but Rural refused, so Feist copied Rural’s white 
pages listing without permission. 
Suspecting Feist of copying its white pages listings, Rural 
inserted six fictitious listings into its 1982-1983 white pages directory. 
When Feist used Rural’s directory to update its 1983 Northwest 
Kansas Area-Wide Telephone Directory, it copied four of the 
fictitious listings. 
Rural, tipped off by the fictitious listings, sued Feist for copyright 
infringement. The district court granted summary judgment to 
Rural, holding that copyright does protect telephone directories, and 
the circuit court affirmed.20 The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that copyright could not protect the elements of Rural’s white pages 
directory copied by Feist because they lacked originality. 
Specifically, the Court found that the individual listings copied by 
Feist lacked originality because they were “facts” and therefore not 
“independently created” by Rural; and the compilation of listings 
copied by Feist lacked originality because its creation did not require 
any “creativity.”21 
A. ORIGINALITY 
The Court began by observing that copyright can only protect 
the original works of authorship: “The sine qua non of copyright is 
originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be 
                                                          
 
 
 
20 Rural v. Feist, 663 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. Kan. 1987), aff’d, 916 F. 2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990), 
rev’d 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
21 Feist, 499 U.S. at 342.. 
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original to the author.” 22  Originality “is a constitutional 
requirement,” because the Intellectual Property Clause only 
authorizes Congress to grant copyright protection to original works 
of authorship.23  
The Court also held that copyright can only protect the original 
“elements” of a work of authorship: 
The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that 
every element of the work may be protected. Originality 
remains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright 
protection may extend only to those components of a work 
that are original to the author.24 
By implication, a “work of authorship” may—and typically 
does—consist of both original elements that are protected by 
copyright and unoriginal elements that are not. The Copyright Act 
defines a “compilation” as “a work formed by the collection and 
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a 
whole constitutes an original work of authorship.”25 In other words, 
the Copyright Act defines a “compilation” as a work of authorship 
created by compiling unoriginal elements in an original way. 
Copyright cannot protect the unoriginal elements, but can protect the 
original way in which they are compiled. However, if copyright 
independently protects each original element of a work, then every 
“work of authorship” is effectively a “compilation” of original and 
                                                          
 
 
 
22 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (emphasis in original). 
23 Id. at 346 (1991) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 
82 (1879); and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53 (1884)). 
24 Id. at 348 (emphasis in original). 
25 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015). 
2017]      AGAINST CREATIVITY  
 
 
435 
unoriginal elements, which copyright may also protect as an original 
selection, ordering, or arrangement of those elements.26 
Notably, the Court’s conclusion that copyright can only protect 
the original elements of a work of authorship renders the 
reproduction and adaptation rights redundant. The reproduction 
right gives copyright owners the exclusive right “to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords” and the adaptation 
right gives copyright owners the exclusive right “to prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.”27 A “derivative 
work” is a work that copies one or more original elements of a 
copyrighted work. 28  In other words, the adaptation right gives 
copyright owners the exclusive right to reproduce the original 
elements of a copyrighted work. So, if the reproduction right attaches 
only to a “copyrighted work” as a whole, then it merely gives 
copyright owners a subset of the rights given by the adaptation right. 
Accordingly, if the reproduction right attaches to each original 
element of a “copyrighted work,” then it is congruent with the 
adaptation right. 
In any case, the Court held that “originality” requires both 
“independent creation” and some degree of “creativity”: 
Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that 
the work was independently created by the author (as 
                                                          
 
 
 
26 See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Intern., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F. 2d 693 (2d. Cir. 1992). See 
also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169 (2008) (“How-
ever, if a very literal approach is taken, there is likely no work of authorship that is not 
a compilation under the statutory definition.”). 
27 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(2) (2015). 
28 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (1963) (stating “a work will be con-
sidered a derivative work only if it would be considered an infringing work if the ma-
terial that it has derived from a pre-existing work had been taken without the consent 
of a copyright proprietor of such pre-existing work”). 
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opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses 
at least some minimal degree of creativity.29  
The Court reached the correct result under the economic theory 
of copyright, because Rural did not need a copyright incentive to 
produce its white pages listings. But unfortunately, it failed to 
provide a coherent explanation of why either the independent 
creation or creativity requirements precluded copyright protection of 
the white pages listings copied by Feist. 
1. Independent Creation 
First, the Court held that the individual white pages listings 
lacked “originality” because they were “facts” and therefore not 
“independently created” by Rural. The “independent creation” 
requirement provides that copyright can only protect the elements of 
a work that are not “copied” from another work.30 In other words, 
copyright can only protect the elements of a work of authorship that 
were actually created by an author of that work. If an element of a 
work is copied from a pre-existing work, the copyright in that 
element, if any, belongs to the author of the pre-existing work. 
The Court held that the independent creation requirement 
precludes copyright protection of “facts,” because they are not 
created by an author: 
“No one may claim originality as to facts.” This is because 
facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. The 
distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first 
person to find and report a particular fact has not created the 
fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence. To borrow 
                                                          
 
 
 
29 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
30 Id. at 345-47 (1991) 
2017]      AGAINST CREATIVITY  
 
 
437 
from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its 
“maker” or “originator.” “The discoverer merely finds and 
records.”31 
Accordingly, the Court held that copyright could not protect 
Rural’s white pages listings, because they were “facts” that Rural 
discovered and reported, but did not create.32  
[D]id Feist, by taking 1,309 names, towns, and telephone 
numbers from Rural’s white pages, copy anything that was 
“original” to Rural? Certainly, the raw data does not satisfy 
the originality requirement. Rural may have been the first to 
discover and report the names, towns, and telephone 
numbers of its subscribers, but this data does not “ow[e] its 
origin” to Rural. Rather, these bits of information are 
uncopyrightable facts; they existed before Rural reported 
them and would have continued to exist if Rural had never 
published a telephone directory.33 
This is nonsense. To begin with, Rural did not “discover and 
report the names, towns, and telephone numbers of its subscribers.” 
It assigned telephone numbers to its subscribers, thereby creating the 
“fact” that a particular telephone number was associated with a 
particular subscriber. And Rural created new “facts” every time it 
added a new subscriber, changed a subscriber’s telephone number, 
or removed a former subscriber. 
More importantly, the Court failed to define “facts” or provide a 
coherent explanation of why they cannot be protected by copyright. 
Presumably, by “facts” the Court meant something like “true 
                                                          
 
 
 
31  Id. at 347 (internal citations omitted) (citing NIMMER, supra note 28, §§ 2.11[A], 
2.03[E], and then Burrow-Giles, 111 U. S. at 58).  
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 361 (1991) (internal citation omitted). 
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statements about the world.”34 Yet, on that definition, at least some 
of the listings copied by Feist were not “facts.” For example, Feist 
copied four fake listings created by Rural in order to detect copying. 
Were those fake listings “facts”? If not, were they protected by 
copyright? Presumably, at least some of the listings copied by Feist 
were inaccurate. Were those inaccurate listings “facts”? If not, were 
they protected by copyright? What about telephone listings reported 
in a fictional work?35 
2. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy 
Luckily, the idea-expression dichotomy provides a coherent 
explanation of why copyright cannot protect “facts.” The idea-
expression dichotomy provides that copyright can protect particular 
expressions of an idea, but cannot protect the idea itself. It began as 
a common law doctrine that Congress eventually codified.36 As the 
Copyright Act provides: “In no case does copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
or embodied in such work.” 37  For example, under the idea-
expression dichotomy, copyright cannot protect a bookkeeping 
system because it is an idea, but it can protect an explanation of a 
bookkeeping system because it is a particular expression of an idea.38 
                                                          
 
 
 
34 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007). 
35 See, e.g., Id. (observing that “social facts” are generated by original expressions);  Te-
min, supra note 6 (arguing that the listings were not “facts” at all, but “literary works” 
independently created by Rural). 
36 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
37 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2015). 
38 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). 
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The so-called “merger doctrine” is essentially a gloss on the idea-
expression dichotomy. It provides that when an idea can only be 
expressed in a limited number of ways, the idea and expression 
“merge,” and copyright then cannot protect particular expressions of 
that idea. 39  Essentially, the idea-expression dichotomy and the 
merger doctrine express different versions of the principle that 
copyright cannot protect abstractions, but can protect particular 
expressions. 
A fact is simply an idea that inherently can only be expressed in 
a limited number of ways. As a consequence, copyright cannot 
protect particular expressions of such ideas. For example, a telephone 
listing expresses the idea: “name, address, telephone number.” 
Accordingly, copyright cannot protect a telephone listing because it 
is reduced to the very idea it expresses. The same is true of a fake or 
inaccurate telephone listing. Likewise, a mathematical equation 
expresses an idea. Copyright cannot protect a mathematical equation 
because it reduces to the idea it expresses, whether or not that idea is 
true. As Justin Hughes has observed, “[W]hen a distinguished judge 
or scholar just says facts are not protected by copyright law, he or she 
is engaged in a form of shorthand that is more than just imprecision. 
It is a subconscious application of copyright’s merger doctrine.”40 
B. CREATIVITY 
Second, the Court held that the compilation of white pages 
listings copied by Feist also lacked “originality” because its creation 
did not require any “creativity.” Specifically, the Court held that 
copyright cannot protect “facts,” but can protect a “compilation of 
                                                          
 
 
 
39 Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble, 379 F. 2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967); Herbert Rosenthal Jew-
elry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F. 2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). 
40 Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 43, 56 (2007). 
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facts,” so long as its ordering, selection, or arrangement of those facts 
is both independently created and sufficiently creative: 
Factual compilations, on the other hand, may possess the 
requisite originality. The compilation author typically 
chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them, 
and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be 
used effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and 
arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the 
compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are 
sufficiently original that Congress may protect such 
compilations through the copyright laws.41 
The Court explicitly recognized the tension between this 
“creativity” requirement and its longstanding “aesthetic 
nondiscrimination principle,” which provides that courts may not 
consider the aesthetic value of a work of authorship when 
determining whether it is protected by copyright. 42  The Court 
adopted the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle in Bleistein v. 
Donaldson, holding that copyright could protect posters used to 
advertise a circus. As Justice Holmes observed: 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained 
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of 
genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very 
novelty would make them repulsive until the public had 
                                                          
 
 
 
41 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). 
42 Id. at 359 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 
(1903)). See generally Brian L. Frye, Aesthetic Nondiscrimination & Fair Use, 3 BELMONT 
LAW REVIEW 29 (2016). 
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learned the new language in which their author spoke. It 
may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the 
etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been 
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other 
end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed 
to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command 
the interest of any public, they have a commercial value — it 
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and 
educational value — and the taste of any public is not to be 
treated with contempt. It is an ultimate fact for the moment, 
whatever may be our hopes for a change. That these pictures 
had their worth and their success is sufficiently shown by the 
desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs’ 
rights.43 
Notably, no court has ever used the term “aesthetic 
nondiscrimination.” Nevertheless, courts have universally adopted 
Holmes’s minimalistic definition of originality, and the aesthetic 
nondiscrimination principle has come to define the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter.44 As Holmes explained: 
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon 
nature. Personality always contains something unique. It 
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very 
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is 
one man's alone. That something he may copyright unless 
there is a restriction in the words of the act.45 
                                                          
 
 
 
43 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903). 
44 See Diane Leenheer Zimmermann, It’s an Original! (?): In Pursuit of Copyright’s Elusive 
Essence, 28 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 187, 204 (2005). 
45 Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. 
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In other words, copyright can protect any original expression, no 
matter how banal or trivial. Or rather, as Brad Greenberg has 
observed, copyright is like an Oprah giveaway: everybody gets one.46 
The Court recognized this tension. Under the “aesthetic 
nondiscrimination” doctrine, courts cannot consider the aesthetic 
value of an element of a work of authorship in determining whether 
it is protected by copyright, but under the “creativity” requirement, 
courts must consider the aesthetic value of an element of a work of 
authorship in order to determine whether it is “original” and thus 
protected by copyright.  
The Court tried to reconcile the “aesthetic nondiscrimination” 
doctrine and the “creativity” requirement by holding that originality 
requires only a “minimal” amount of “creativity.” 47  It noted that 
even the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle articulated in Bleistein 
explicitly excluded at least some works from copyright protection.48 
And it tried to reconcile the tension between the aesthetic 
nondiscrimination doctrine and the creativity requirement by 
holding that originality requires vanishingly little “creativity”: 
[T]he originality requirement is not particularly stringent. A 
compiler may settle upon a selection or arrangement that 
others have used; novelty is not required. Originality 
requires only that the author make the selection or 
arrangement independently (i.e., without copying that 
                                                          
 
 
 
46 Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright and Trademark Troll: Fable or Fact?, Panel Remarks 
at Chapman University School of Law, Law Review Symposium (Jan. 30, 2015) (audio 
recording 19:34–19:53), available at http://ibc.chapman.edu/Mediasite/Play/5fee
649a60414522a5a1c1627f222ff81d.  
47 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358-59 (1991). 
48 Id. (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (“It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest 
and most obvious limits.”)). 
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selection or arrangement from another work), and that it 
display some minimal level of creativity. Presumably, the 
vast majority of compilations will pass this test, but not all 
will. There remains a narrow category of works in which the 
creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually 
nonexistent . . . .49 
As mentioned, originality is not a stringent standard; it does 
not require that facts be presented in an innovative or 
surprising way. It is equally true, however, that the selection 
and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine 
as to require no creativity whatsoever. The standard of 
originality is low, but it does exist. As this Court has 
explained, the Constitution mandates some minimal degree 
of creativity, and an author who claims infringement must 
prove “the existence of . . . intellectual production, of 
thought, and conception.”50 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that copyright could not 
protect Rural’s white pages directory as a “compilation of facts” 
because Rural’s selection, ordering, and arrangement of its white 
pages listings lacked any creativity whatsoever.  
The selection, coordination, and arrangement of Rural’s 
white pages do not satisfy the minimum constitutional 
standards for copyright protection. As mentioned at the 
outset, Rural’s white pages are entirely typical. Persons 
desiring telephone service in Rural’s service area fill out an 
application and Rural issues them a telephone number. In 
preparing its white pages, Rural simply takes the data 
                                                          
 
 
 
49 Id. at 358-59.  
50 Id. at 362 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. 
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884)). 
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provided by its subscribers and lists it alphabetically by 
surname. The end product is a garden-variety white pages 
directory, devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity. 
Rural’s selection of listings could not be more obvious: It 
publishes the most basic information—name, town, and 
telephone number—about each person who applies to it for 
telephone service. This is “selection” of a sort, but it lacks the 
modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection 
into copyrightable expression. Rural expended sufficient 
effort to make the white pages directory useful, but 
insufficient creativity to make it original . . . . 
Nor can Rural claim originality in its coordination and 
arrangement of facts. The white pages do nothing more than 
list Rural’s subscribers in alphabetical order. This 
arrangement may, technically speaking, owe its origin to 
Rural; no one disputes that Rural undertook the task of 
alphabetizing the names itself. But there is nothing remotely 
creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white 
pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in 
tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be 
expected as a matter of course. It is not only unoriginal, it is 
practically inevitable. This time-honored tradition does not 
possess the minimal creative spark required by the 
Copyright Act and the Constitution.51 
We conclude that the names, towns, and telephone numbers 
copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were 
not protected by the copyright in Rural’s combined white 
and yellow pages directory. As a constitutional matter, 
                                                          
 
 
 
51 Id. at 362-64 (internal citations omitted). 
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copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work 
that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity. 
Rural’s white pages, limited to basic subscriber information 
and arranged alphabetically, fall short of the mark. As a 
statutory matter, 17 U. S. C. § 101 does not afford protection 
from copying to a collection of facts that are selected, 
coordinated, and arranged in a way that utterly lacks 
originality. Given that some works must fail, we cannot 
imagine a more likely candidate. Indeed, were we to hold 
that Rural’s white pages pass muster, it is hard to believe that 
any collection of facts could fail. 
Unfortunately, the Court failed to define “creativity,” or provide 
any explanation of what “creativity” requires. As a consequence, 
lower courts have struggled to apply the “creativity” requirement or 
even to understand its purpose.52 In practice, lower courts typically 
recognize that “originality” requires both “independent creation” 
and “creativity,” but ignore the “creativity” requirement.53 
This is entirely understandable since the “creativity” 
requirement is irrelevant. 54  The Court adopted the “creativity” 
requirement in order to address the facts before the Court and 
explain why copyright cannot protect the selection, ordering, and 
arrangement of the listings in a white pages telephone directory. 
However, the Court could have achieved the same result by simply 
                                                          
 
 
 
52 See generally Temin, supra note 6; Omri Rachum-Twaig, Recreating Copyright: The Cog-
nitive Process of Creation and Copyright Law, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 287 (2017).  
53 See Karjala, supra note 26, at 186 (“After Feist was decided, it was predictable that 
courts seeking to prevent market failures for ‘sweat of the brow’ works would broaden 
their search for creativity in an effort to maintain the incentive to create works valued 
by society, such as many maps and compilations that lack the stamp of authorial cre-
ativity on their face.”). 
54 Cf. Temin, supra note 6,. 
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applying the idea-expression dichotomy. As explained above, the 
idea-expression dichotomy provides that copyright cannot protect 
an individual telephone listing because there is only one way to 
express the idea: name, address, telephone number. Furthermore, the 
idea-expression dichotomy also provides that copyright cannot 
protect the selection, ordering, and arrangement of the listings in a 
white pages telephone directory for the same reason. The selection, 
ordering, and arrangement of the listings in Rural’s white pages 
telephone directory expressed the idea: Rural’s telephone subscribers 
in alphabetical order. There is only one way to express this idea and 
so it cannot be protected by copyright. 
In the alternative, the Court could have held that copyright 
cannot protect a white pages telephone directory as a compilation of 
facts because the selection, ordering, and arrangement of those facts 
is purely functional. 55  The Copyright Act excludes the functional 
elements of a work of authorship from copyright protection.56 The 
selection, ordering, and arrangement of the listings in a white pages 
telephone directory are not expressive in any way. They are instead 
functional because they serve the purpose of enabling a user of the 
directory to locate the desired listing. 
In any case, the Court presumably intended the “creativity” 
requirement to limit the scope of copyright protection by ensuring 
that copyright cannot protect trivial or banal expressions. 57 
Unfortunately, it accomplished exactly the opposite. The Court tried 
                                                          
 
 
 
55 See Karjala, supra note 26, at 179; Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copy-
right Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439, 468-69, n.119 (2003) 
56 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2015) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”). 
57 See generally Zimmermann, supra note 44; see also Temin, supra note 6 (predicting that 
Feist would cause market failures by preventing copyright protection of valuable fac-
tual works); Karjala, supra note 26, at 179 (predicting the same). 
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to reconcile the “aesthetic nondiscrimination” doctrine and the 
“creativity” requirement by requiring only a “minimal” amount of 
“creativity.” But it set the “creativity” bar so low that essentially 
anything but a white pages telephone directory qualifies as 
“creative.” Indeed, even a yellow pages telephone directory is 
sufficiently “creative” for copyright protection. The Court itself 
suggested that copyright could protect not only Rural’s yellow pages 
listings, but also some elements of Rural’s white pages listings that 
Feist did not copy.58 Lower courts subsequently held that copyright 
could protect an ethnic telephone directory and an automobile price 
guide.59 If the Court intended the “creativity” requirement to limit 
the scope of copyrightable subject matter, it failed miserably. 
IV.  “CREATIVITY RHETORIC” 
After Feist, the nature of copyrightable subject matter went from 
purely descriptive to both descriptive and normative. Under the 
aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine, a work of authorship simply 
was or was not protected by copyright. Whether copyright protected 
a work of authorship did not imply any normative judgment about 
the value of the work. By contrast, under the “creativity” 
requirement, a work of authorship implicitly either should or should 
not be protected by copyright. Suddenly, copyrightable subject 
matter acquired a subtle normative tinge. Yet since every work of 
authorship is in practice protected by copyright, it follows every 
work of authorship “should” be protected by copyright. 
                                                          
 
 
 
58 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (“Feist appears to con-
cede that Rural's directory, considered as a whole, is subject to a valid copyright be-
cause it contains some foreword text, as well as original material in its yellow pages 
advertisements. See Brief for Petitioner 18; Pet. for Cert. 9.”). 
59 Key Publ’ns v. Chinatown Today Pub. Ent., 945 F. 2d 509 (2d. Cir. 1991); CCC Info. 
Serv. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Rep., 44 F. 3d 61 (2d. Cir. 1994). 
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While the “creativity” requirement itself is functionally 
irrelevant, it encouraged the use of “creativity rhetoric,” which has 
profoundly affected copyright doctrine. Under the aesthetic 
nondiscrimination doctrine, original works of authorship received 
copyright protection, irrespective of their aesthetic value. 
Accordingly, copyright protection carried no implication of aesthetic 
value. But under the “creativity” requirement, a work of authorship 
is “original” and entitled to copyright protection if and only if it has 
a “creative” element, no matter how trivial. As a result, copyright 
protection does imply aesthetic value, even though the “creativity” 
requirement does not actually require it. 
“Creativity rhetoric” assumes that the purpose of copyright is to 
promote creativity. This is readily apparent in both judicial opinions 
and copyright scholarship.60 For example, many courts have opined 
that the purpose of copyright is to promote creativity.61 And many 
scholars agree, although they disagree about whether it is successful. 
Some argue that copyright reduces creativity by prohibiting copying 
                                                          
 
 
 
60 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1151, 1151 (2007) ("Creativity is universally agreed to be a good that copyright 
law should seek to promote"); Ned Snow, The Regressing Progress Clause: Rethinking 
Constitutional Indifference to Harmful Content in Copyright, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 40 
(2013) ("[I]n no uncertain terms the Court has articulated a view of copyright that de-
fines the primary objective of copyright as creativity or originality (which turns on 
creativity)."); Omri Rachum-Twaig, Recreating Copyright: The Cognitive Process of Crea-
tion and Copyright Law, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. (forthcoming),  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2776292 (stating that “copy-
right’s primary goal is to promote creativity”). 
61 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (observing that exclusive intel-
lectual property rights are “intended to encourage the creativity of ‘Authors and In-
ventors’”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (stating 
that the “ultimate aim” of copyright law is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the gen-
eral public good”). 
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and preventing productive re-use.62 Others argue that it increases 
creativity by discouraging copying and encouraging novelty.63 
Creativity rhetoric is broadly compatible with many theories of 
copyright. Deontological theories of copyright can coherently 
embrace creativity rhetoric, especially insofar as it argues that 
copyright should protect aesthetically valuable works of authorship. 
And at least some consequentialist theories of copyright can 
coherently embrace creativity rhetoric, insofar as they argue that 
promoting creativity will increase happiness or net welfare. 
However, creativity rhetoric may be incompatible with the economic 
theory of copyright.  
V. AGAINST CREATIVITY 
The economic theory of copyright holds that copyright is 
justified because it increases net economic welfare by solving market 
and government failures in works of authorship. In other words, 
under the economic theory, the purpose of copyright is to increase 
the efficiency of the market for works of authorship by encouraging 
marginal authors to satisfy consumer demand for works of 
authorship. 
By contrast, creativity rhetoric assumes that the purpose of 
copyright is to promote “creativity,” which is typically associated 
                                                          
 
 
 
62 See, e.g., LARRY LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY TO LOCK 
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004). 
63 Fishman, supra note 5,. But see Dan L. Burk, The “Creating Around” Paradox, 128 
HARV. L. REV. FORUM 118 (2015).  
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with novelty. 64  “Creativity is the art of the new.” 65  For example, 
Fishman argues that copyright promotes “creativity” by constraining 
copying and encouraging novelty. 66  Likewise, Parchomovsky and 
Stein argue that copyright should promote creativity by granting 
more protection to novel works and less protection to generic works: 
“The problem with the existing design is that by rewarding 
minimally original works and highly original works alike, the law 
incentivizes authors to produce works containing just enough 
originality to receive protection—but not more.”67 
There is no reason to assume that consumers demand 
“creativity.” In fact, the market for works of authorship suggests the 
opposite. 68  In general, consumers tend to prefer works that are 
generic and familiar, and tend to reject works that are unusual and 
unfamiliar. 69  For example, genre fiction is often popular, but 
                                                          
 
 
 
64  See, e.g., Creativity, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, https://www.britan-
nica.com/topic/creativity; Zimmermann, supra note 44, at 208 (“On the one hand, as 
I noted earlier, Justice O'Connor wrote that she and her colleagues were not demand-
ing novelty. In the next breath, however, she went on to explain that Rural's failure to 
be original lay in the fact that it organized the names and telephone numbers of its 
subscribers using a trite, “entirely typical” methodology. A problem of lack of novelty, 
perhaps?”). 
65 Madison, supra note 2, at 824. 
66 Fishman, supra note 5. 
67 Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505 (2009). Notably, 
Karjala suggests that is already the case. Karjala, supra note 26, at 178-79 (“[C]reativity 
is often not merely a necessary condition for copyright protection, but for many courts 
it is also a sufficient condition. Moreover, the scope of protection runs to the creativity 
the court finds in the work.”). But see Simon Stern, Copyright, Originality, and the Public 
Domain in Eighteenth-Century England, in ORIGINALITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH ENLIGHTENMENT 69-101 (Reginald McGinnis, ed., 2008).  
68  See, e.g., Planet Money, Episode 288: Manufacturing The Song Of The Summer, 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Jul. 10, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sec-
tions/money/2015/07/10/421874671/episode-288-manufacturing-the-song-of-the-
summer (observing that hit songs are typically similar to but slightly different from 
previous hit songs). 
69 See Omri Rachum-Twaig, A Genre Theory of Copyright, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 34 (2016).  
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experimental fiction is rarely popular.70 Pop music is often popular, 
but experimental music is rarely popular.71 Genre films are often 
popular, but experimental films are rarely popular. 72  And so on. 
While “creativity” may be aesthetically valuable, it is rarely popular; 
and while banality may not be aesthetically valuable, it is often quite 
popular. Of course, there are innumerable exceptions—many generic 
and familiar works fail to sell while some unusual and unfamiliar 
works are best-sellers. However, in general, the most popular works 
are generic and familiar, while most unusual and unfamiliar works 
are unpopular.  
In other words, creativity rhetoric is inconsistent with the 
economic theory of copyright. While creativity rhetoric assumes that 
the purpose of copyright is to encourage creativity, the economic 
theory of copyright assumes that the purpose of copyright is to solve 
market failures in works of authorship demanded by consumers. 
And it appears that creativity is negatively correlated with consumer 
demand. For better or worse, consumers tend to favor familiar works 
of authorship and disfavor creative ones. 
This inconsistency suggests that copyright may cause market 
failures, rather than solve them. For example, Fishman argues that 
copyright encourages creativity by discouraging copying.73 If he is 
right, then copyright may discourage the production of works 
consumers demand, and encourage the production of works they do 
not. In other words, by increasing creativity, copyright may decrease 
                                                          
 
 
 
  
 
70 See New York Times' Bestsellers' List, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2017 available at https://
www.nytimes.com/books/best-sellers/ (last visited July 24, 2017). 
71 See Billboard Hot 100, BILLBOARD, July 29, 2017 available at http://www.billboard.
com/charts/hot-100 (last visited July 24, 2017).  
72  See Variety Box Office, VARIETY, http://variety.com/v/film/box-office/ (last 
visited July 24, 2017). 
73 Fishman, supra note 5. 
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economic efficiency. Notably, authors can and do use licensing to 
solve this government failure caused by creativity rhetoric, but they 
are constrained by transaction costs.74 
Making matters worse, creativity rhetoric further decreases the 
efficiency of copyright law by inducing courts to narrow the scope of 
the fair use doctrine. In theory, the creativity requirement limits 
copyrightable subject matter, and transformativeness limits the fair 
use doctrine. In practice, the creativity requirement is irrelevant 
because the aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine prevents courts 
from considering the aesthetic value of a work of authorship. But the 
aesthetic nondiscrimination doctrine doesn’t apply to fair use. When 
a court considers a fair use defense, it must determine whether the 
use is transformative, which necessarily requires the court to 
consider the aesthetic value of the use. This double standard 
discriminates in favor of copyright owners and against users.75 
Creativity rhetoric exacerbates the problem by encouraging 
copyright normativity. The economic theory of copyright is purely 
consequentialist. It holds that copyright is justified when it increases 
net economic welfare and unjustified when it does not. But creativity 
rhetoric is profoundly normative. It suggests that copyright owners 
deserve to own a copyright in their works of authorship because they 
are creative. And it suggests that fair use is justified only if the use is 
sufficiently creative to outweigh the copyright owner’s moral rights. 
In other words, creativity rhetoric encourages courts to adopt a 
jaundiced view of fair use, in which copyright claims are 
presumptively valid, and fair use claims are presumptively invalid. 
Under the economic theory, the only relevant question should be 
whether allowing the use would increase or decrease net economic 
welfare. 
                                                          
 
 
 
74 See Burk, supra note 63. 
75 Brian L. Frye, Aesthetic Nondiscrimination & Fair Use, 3 BELMONT L. REV. 29 (2016)  
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Ironically, while copyright probably does solve some market and 
government failures in works of authorship, it is ill-suited to 
promoting creativity. The economic theory of copyright assumes that 
authors are rational economic actors who want to satisfy consumer 
demand for works of authorship. To the extent that is true, it 
probably increases the efficiency of the market for works of 
authorship. For example, marginal corporate authors are unlikely to 
invest in the production of certain works of authorship if they cannot 
prevent free riding. Rational economic actors invest in the 
production of works of authorship only if they expect to earn a profit. 
But they also invest in the production of works of authorship that 
consumers demand, i.e., familiar works of authorship. 
By contrast, copyright rarely provides salient incentives to 
authors interested in producing genuinely creative works of 
authorship. 76  While creative authors may respond to certain 
economic incentives, they rarely respond to copyright incentives. 
Recall, the more “creative” a work of authorship, the lower its typical 
economic value. If anything, copyright encourages marginal authors 
to invest in the production of less “creative,” more generic works of 
authorship, assuming they are rational economic actors.  
Copyright is largely irrelevant to most marginal authors 
interested in producing “creative” works. For example, fine artists 
are among the most “creative” authors. But as Amy Adler has 
observed, copyright is largely irrelevant to fine artists.77 If anything, 
they welcome reproduction, as the art market depends on scarcity, 
not reproduction.78 Moreover, their “creativity” effectively becomes 
a form of trademark or trade dress. The same is true of avant-garde 
                                                          
 
 
 
76 See generally JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH (2014). 
77 Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, N.Y.U. L. REV. (2016). 
78  Cf. WALTER BENJAMIN, THE WORK OF ART IN THE AGE OF MECHANICAL 
REPRODUCTION (1936). 
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writers and musicians. Effectively, they sell their “creativity” as a 
distinct brand, rather than selling copies of their works of authorship. 
Relying on copyright to encourage creativity is highly inefficient, 
because it imposes a high economic cost and provides only a low 
social benefit. Copyright increases the cost of generic and familiar 
works of authorship by providing broader and longer rights than are 
necessary to provide salient incentives to marginal authors, and it 
does not provide a salient incentive to the most creative authors, who 
respond to very different market signals. 
CONCLUSION 
The adoption of the “creativity” requirement and the rise of 
“creativity rhetoric” are unfortunate developments in copyright 
doctrine and scholarship because they are a distraction from the 
purpose of copyright, which is to increase net economic welfare. 
Copyright should ignore “creativity” and instead focus on economic 
value. 
